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oth the telecommunications market and telecommunications 
regulation have changed in the United States over the past decade. 
The U.S. telecommunications market has changed fundamentally 
from the monopoly structure that gave rise to regulation; meanwhile the 
existing framework for regulation continues to depend on the existence of 
monopoly power for its rationale. This article will explain how, as the 
communications options for average consumers have expanded beyond the 
offerings of their incumbent telephone companies to include new telephone 
carriers, e-mail, wireless telephone services and voice over the internet, the 
market has come to warrant a fundamental change in regulatory approach. 
This article does not argue that the changes in market structure imply an end 
to all regulation. However, it does argue that the new competitive dynamics 
in the U.S. telecommunications market warrant a shift in regulation from a 
priori restraints and mandates to more targeted, ex post enforcement against 
anticompetitive conduct and transactions. 
This paper begins by examining how the market for local 
telecommunications services in the United States has changed over the past 
decade and demonstrates that the market no longer resembles the 
monopoly structure that gave rise to the existing regulatory framework. It 
then argues that the demise of the telecommunications monopoly brings with 
it the demise of the rationale and expected benefits of monopoly regulation. 
B
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The article then briefly discusses what kinds of regulation the 
telecommunications market might nonetheless warrant, and argues for an 
approach that emphasizes ex post enforcement against anticompetitive 
conduct instead of a priori restrictions and requirements on firm activities. 
  The transformation of the U.S. telecommunications 
market 
The menu of telecommunications services available to U.S. consumers 
has expanded dramatically over the last ten years. This expanding set of 
choices has, in turn, transformed how people communicate and what they 
demand in terms of telecommunications options. To highlight the changes 
that have taken place, it is worth recalling the options available to a typical 
consumer in 1996. At that time, one person wishing to communicate a 
message to another had four potential choices: (1) pick up the telephone, (2) 
send a letter by mail, (3) place a wireless call by cell phone, or (4) log onto a 
computer and send an e-mail. In reality, however, the vast majority of 
American consumers had only choices (1) and (2). For, while roughly 95 
percent of households had a conventional landline telephone service in 
1996, only 38 million subscribers had wireless telephones, less than 19 
percent of households had internet access, and less than 40 percent of 
households owned personal computers (FCC, 2005b, table 16.1, chart 2.9). 
By 2003-04, the years for which the most comprehensive data is 
currently available, the telecommunications landscape had changed 
remarkably. The most important overall phenomenon has been the evidence 
that consumers now see alternative modes of communication as substitutes 
for each other. Such "inter-modal" competition is reflected by several 
measures of how people consume telecommunications services.  
Wireless telephone services 
The most dramatic change in U.S. telecommunications has been the rise 
in wireless telephone usage in the years since Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereafter the 1996 Act). By the end of 
1996 there were roughly 38 million wireless subscribers in the United States 
and they used their telephones to talk for an average of 125 minutes per 
month (FCC, 2005b, tables 11.1 and 11.3). By the end of 2004, there were 
H.A. SHELANSKI 17 
185 million wireless subscribers in the United States who used their 
telephones to talk for an average of 580 minutes per month (FCC, 2005a, 
para. 5). Today there are more wireless subscribers than conventional 
landline telephone subscribers in the United States (FCC; 2005b, 7.1). 
Moreover, those subscribers are paying less than wireless customers did at 
the time of the 1996 Act's passage. Wireless bills fell by 34 percent from 
1997 to 2004 even with the dramatically increasing usage (FCC, 2005a, 
para. 15;7). Competition in the mobile wireless market continues to drive 
operators to attract customers through price and non-price methods (FCC, 
2005a, para. 101-108). There are currently five facilities-based, nationwide 
wireless carriers operating in the United States (FCC, 2005a, para. 25). 
Almost all U.S. consumers, 97 percent of the population, have access to a 
service from three or more wireless competitors (FCC, 2005a, para. 2). 
There are a number of reasons to believe that wireless service is 
increasingly substituting conventional, local telephone services. Firstly, the 
FCC has found that 62 percent of all Americans, and over 90 percent of 
those between 20 and 49 years old, own cell phones (FCC, 2005a, 
para. 195). As already mentioned, those subscribers have been using their 
wireless phones for an increasing number of minutes per month. This 
increase has been accompanied by a marked decline in the amount of 
landline calling by consumers. In 1996 American consumers made an 
average of 143 minutes of long-distance calls per month; by 2003 that figure 
had fallen to 71 minutes (FCC, 2005b, table 14.2). In 1996 Americans 
placed 504 billion conventional local telephone calls; in 2003 the number 
had dropped to 425 billion (FCC, 2005b, table 10.2). The inference of 
wireless substitution for wireline service is strong, and is corroborated by 
other data. The FCC has reported that 5.5 percent of Americans live in 
wireless-only households, a figure that rises to 14 percent for 18 to 24 year-
olds (FCC, 2005b, para. 196). Yet such figures understate the true degree of 
substitution. As the Commission has found, "[e]ven when not ‘cutting the 
cord' completely, consumers increasingly appear to choose wireless 
services over traditional wireline services, particularly for certain uses" (FCC, 
2005b, para.197). The Commission went on to cite data that one third of all 
households receive over half of their calls wirelessly and 9 percent of 
households receive almost all of their telephone calls on their wireless 
phones (FCC, 2005b, para.197). 
Not surprisingly, the rise of wireless telephone services has put heavy 
pressure on traditional telephone services. In addition to the decline in the 
number of calls and minutes on landline networks, the number of traditional 
phone lines has also dropped, and rather quickly. FCC data shows that by 
18   No. 60, 4th Q. 2005 
each of three different measures of line count, the number of conventional 
telephone lines fell from 1999 through 2003 (the latest available annual data) 
(FCC, 2005b, tabla 7.1). The trend appears to be continuing, as the number 
of landlines dropped at a quarterly rate of 1.2 percent in the second and third 
quarters of 2004 (FCC, 2005a, para.197). 
The degree of direct substitution of wireless for wireline telephony 
understates the competitive significance of wireless services. The average 
American consumer is comfortable with, and equipped with, wireless 
service. The Pew internet and American Life Project found that by 2003, 21 
percent of all American wireless phone users had already considered 
cancelling their conventional home telephone service (HORRIGAN, 2003). 
While most people may continue to subscribe to a wireline service, 
conventional local service providers probably have little power to cut the 
quality or raise the price of their service; as to do so would be to invite 
consumers to pick up their mobile phones more often and simply to cut their 
landline subscriptions. 
Internet-based alternatives to conventional telephony 
Now let's consider computer-based alternatives to conventional 
telephone calls. By 2003, the share of households with computers had 
grown to 61.8 percent and those with internet access to 54.6 percent (FCC, 
2005a, table 2.9). Residential customers and people who worked in small 
businesses together had nearly 26 million high-speed internet access lines 
by the end of 2003, a figure that leapt to over 35 million lines by the end of 
2004 (FCC, 2004, table 3). Importantly, a large number of these high-speed 
lines do not involve wireline telephone networks at all. Over 60 percent of 
high-speed internet access takes place over the coaxial plant of the cable 
networks (FCC, 2005b, table 2.1). 
American consumers have turned the internet into a platform for 
communicating with each other. Whereas, not long ago, real-time, interactive 
telecommunications with another person required picking up a telephone, 
current data show that the largest three on-line "instant messaging" 
providers, AOL, MSN, and Yahoo, respectively have 51.6 million, 27.3 
million, and 21.9 million unique, monthly users (San Francisco Chronicle, 
2005, reporting Neilson data). Such widespread instant messaging, which 
requires only basic (rather than high-speed) internet access, means that a 
tremendous amount of communication is now occurring without the need for 
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a telephone call. The Neilson data just cited builds on earlier evidence of 
instant messaging and e-mail usage. A Pew internet and American Life 
Project cites survey results showing that over 50 million U.S. consumers 
used instant messaging in 2003, and that they did so for an average of over 
300 minutes per month. The Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of 
Society released a study in June 2004 reporting survey data that showed 
American consumers to use e-mail for an average of over 25 minutes per 
day. These data suggest that on-line communication methods have become 
a primary means of communication. The falling price of computers has made 
such modes of communication accessible to the mass market. From 1996 to 
1999 alone, computer prices fell by over 32 percent per year in the United 
States (JORGENSEN, 2001). Since 1999 computer prices have only 
continued to fall, especially on a quality-adjusted basis. Over 90 percent of 
public libraries provide high-speed internet access. 
The cable-modem internet service is of particular competitive significance 
for incumbent local telecommunications providers for several reasons. 
Firstly, as consumers increasingly turn to e-mail and instant messaging as a 
primary means of communication, cable operators compete vigorously with 
the telephone companies and their broadband DSL offerings to attract that 
traffic. Cable operators have been quite successful in that effort, capturing 
over 60 percent of the U.S. broadband access market. Competition between 
cable and telephone carriers for broadband subscribers drove the price of 
DSL access down by 25 percent from 2001 to 2004. 
Secondly, cable modem competition and broadband penetration more 
generally has helped to drive a wedge between voice telephone service and 
the physical infrastructure over which it runs. For decades, voice service was 
identified with the underlying telephone network. Cable telephony (switched 
telephone service running over cable plant) similarly requires service 
providers to own, or purchase access to, a physical network to provide voice 
services. With the rise of broadband internet access, however, a set of voice 
service providers has arisen that owns no network infrastructure at all and 
instead provides voice service as an application that consumers can reach 
over the internet. 
Such voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP) services, like wireless providers, 
provide a voice option that does not always, but can and often does, entirely 
bypass incumbent local telephone networks. The technology for VoIP is 
improving rapidly and use is rising accordingly. A range of services, from 
free computer-to-computer calling to more sophisticated offerings that 
operate over conventional handsets, are available. Projections show that 
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within a few years 20 million households will use VoIP without any 
conventional telephone connection. However, as the mainstream press has 
recently chronicled, the services are already available to those who want 
them and VoIP may take off much more quickly than anticipated 
(FITZGERALD, 2005). Other evidence suggests that VoIP is not likely to be 
a panacea for concentration in the telecommunications market. In a 2004 
study, RAPPOPORT et al. (2005) found that demand for VoIP services is 
quite sensitive to price and that the potential market size for VoIP may be 
much smaller than some advocates contend. While the magnitude of VoIP's 
future impact may be unclear, the service does have competitive potential. 
Nearly 90 percent of U.S. households are passed by upgraded cable plant 
that provides a cable modem service. With computers having become 
inexpensive and ubiquitous, with competing ways to get broadband access, 
and with the separation of a voice service from the physical infrastructure of 
the Public Switched Network (PSTN) through VoIP offerings, many 
consumers have yet another option in addition to wireless for working 
around conventional local telephone services. 
Other broadband technologies are on the horizon. Broadband over power 
lines, WiFi internet access, WiMax, and satellite services are developing to 
different degrees and may soon make significant inroads. These 
technologies are not illusory; all that is in question is the extent to which they 
will affect competition in the telecommunications market, and the broadband 
access market in particular. In 1999, there were 312,000 subscribers to 
broadband over fiber or powerline networks; by 2004 that figure had grown 
to about 698,000 (FCC, 2004, table 2.1). Similarly, in 1999 there were about 
50,000 satellite or terrestrial wireless broadband subscribers; by 2004 the 
figure had increased more than tenfold to 550,000. These figures are likely 
to increase, particularly as WiFi networks proliferate across the country 
providing internet access alternatives to cable and telephone networks. 
New wireline telephone competitors 
The incumbent local exchange providers face not only competition from 
other modes of communication, but from new landline telephone providers 
as well. In 1999, competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) served only 
about 8 million lines – 4.3 percent of the local exchange market (FCC, 
2004b). By December 2004 that figure had increased to nearly 33 million 
lines – 18.5 percent of the local exchange market. Over the same period, the 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) saw their aggregate line count 
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fall from roughly 181 million to 145 million. That change in market share is 
reflected in revenues, with ILECs going from 94.2 percent to 85 percent of 
local telephone revenues from 1999 to 2003 and CLECs (and other non-
ILEC providers) correspondingly rising from 5.8 percent to 15 percent over 
the same period (FCC, 2005b, table 8.7). The FCC reports that 97 percent of 
U.S. households reside in zip codes served by at least one CLEC (FCC, 
2004b, p. 4). Even though the telecommunications market has grown 
significantly in recent years with the rise of the internet, local service 
revenues for the ILECs have remained flat in nominal terms – and hence 
declined in real terms. ILECs altogether had local service revenues of about 
USD 103 billion in 1999 and around USD 104 billion in 2003; and their 
overall (including, for example, long-distance service) revenues declined 
from USD 112 billion to USD 109 billion over that same period (FCC, 2004b, 
p. 4). Indeed, the CPI for telecommunications services declined by 0.01 
percent from 1994 to 2004, compared with CPI increase for all goods of 2.5 
percent over that same period (FCC, 2004b, p. 12.1). 
The story of competing landline carriers – "intra-modal" competition – is a 
little more complicated than that of inter-modal (i.e. wireless and internet) 
competition due to the fact that some degree of CLEC entry depends on 
ILEC facilities to which CLECs gain access pursuant to the (Unbundled 
Network Element (UNE) provisions of the 1996 Act. Competition coming 
solely over CLEC-owned facilities is less than that reported above: about 26 
percent of CLEC lines were served entirely over their own facilities at the 
end of 2004, while 58 percent depended on UNEs (the remainder being 
resale of ILEC services) (FCC, 2004b, table 3). However, one cannot 
conclude from this data that CLEC competition is weak. Firstly, one reason 
why facilities-based competition is comparatively low may be that regulation 
has made an attractive alternative available. Indeed, the FCC itself 
concluded that the model by which many states calculated UNE prices may 
well have distorted the entry path chosen by CLECs and biased them toward 
UNE-based, as opposed to facilities-based, competition (FCC, 2003). 
Secondly, facilities-based entry appears to be on the rise as UNE availability 
decreases in the wake of recent FCC unbundling decisions; the share of 
lines served over CLEC-owned facilities increased 2 percent in the second 
half of 2004 (FCC, 2004b, table 3). 
The most important thing to keep in mind, however, is that it is not up to 
CLECs alone, or even primarily, to impose competitive discipline on the 
ILECs. The 1996 Act may have seen CLECs as the main hope for local 
competition, but inter-modal competition from wireless and internet based 
telecommunications have provided major challenges to the former telephone 
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monopolies. The combination of inter- and intra-modal competition have 
greatly diminished the prospects for any exercise of market power by ILECs. 
  Conventional regulation and its monopoly rationale 
To understand the regulatory consequences of the changing market 
structure described above, it is important to understand the degree to which 
conventional regulation – by which I mean the regime of specific rules that 
sets out, in advance, requirements and restrictions on business conduct by 
specific firms – developed in response to telecommunications monopoly and 
depends on the persistence of monopoly power for its continued 
applicability. 
Telephone regulation before 1996 
By the end of World War I, the structure, conduct and performance of 
U.S. telecommunications began to match the classic characteristics of a 
regulated industry: in most areas the market contained a single provider of 
an important service; a provider that had apparent power to set prices and 
control output (PAGE, 1941, p. 3). It seemed clear that such power would, if 
unregulated, be used to fatten profits at the expense of consumers, refrain 
from serving less profitable customers and extend market power into new or 
adjacent lines of business. From these perceived hazards emerged three 
principal objectives of telephone regulation: 
The first objective of regulation, in response to the pricing power that 
monopolists typically wield, was to keep retail prices "reasonable" and well 
below monopoly levels. For most of the twentieth century, state agencies 
pursued this goal through direct review and constraint of the retail rates the 
AT&T companies could charge in their respective state service areas (FCC, 
1989). Although local telephone rates were subject only to state regulation, 
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") had the authority (often 
only weakly exercised) to regulate interstate, long-distance calling rates at 
the federal level 1. Although virtually no federal regulation of rates for 
interstate (i.e. long-distance) telephone service remains, regulation of retail 
                     
1 See FCC (1975) for an example of such interstate rate regulation by the FCC. 
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rates for local telephone service is the exclusive domain of state authorities 
under section 152(b) of the Communications Act and remains very much in 
place. 
The second objective of monopoly regulation, which came to be known 
as "universal service," was to guarantee access by all Americans to 
telephone services. At first "universal service" was a slogan advanced by 
AT&T to obtain and retain customers in the face of competition (it had the 
only long distance service, hence "universal"), and later to obtain 
authorization to acquire competitors and still later to sell the idea that a 
telephone monopoly would be beneficial to society (and, it so happens, 
AT&T) (MUELLER, 1997). Eventually the term came to stand instead for the 
idea that the Bell System would, as a condition of its monopoly franchises, 
provide quality service to all consumers, and do so at fair and generally 
equal rates. Universal service thus came to comprise distributive goals that 
directly implicated economic questions about retail rates. Universal service 
regulation accomplished two things. First, the policy arguably sped the 
deployment of a high-quality telecommunications network to virtually all 
Americans. Secondly, it led to rate structures through which some kinds of 
consumers and services subsidized other consumers and services. 
Universal service thus became deeply enmeshed in the monopoly structure 
of telecommunications because the subsidy flows on which the policies 
depended were much easier to organize within a single entity than among 
numerous, potentially competing service providers. 
The third objective of telecommunications regulation was to control the 
scope of AT&T's monopoly. The Bell System encompassed not just the 
state-by-state franchise monopolies over local service, but also nationwide 
long-distance telephone service, customer equipment (i.e. telephones), and 
network equipment (i.e. switches and other elements of the phone system). 
How many of these different markets should AT&T be able to monopolize? 
Partly through regulation but also through antitrust enforcement, the scope 
of AT&T's monopoly flowed and ultimately ebbed over the course of the last 
century. 
For example, AT&T early-on placed "foreign attachment" prohibitions in 
its local tariffs that barred customers from attaching any non-AT&T 
equipment to the network. In 1947 the FCC questioned such restrictions and 
struck down AT&T's prohibition on the attachment of non-AT&T devices that 
customers could use to record telephone calls (FCC, 1947). AT&T did not 
even manufacture such devices, but evidently wished to reserve that market 
for itself. The FCC determined the company's monopoly could not extend so 
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far (FCC, 1947, p. 1048). AT&T's efforts to maintain dominance in the long-
distance market provoked both regulatory and antitrust responses and 
ultimately resulted in the 1984 break-up of the Bell System into independent 
local and long-distance companies 2. 
Regulation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996  
Congress designed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to dismantle the 
exclusive local-exchange franchises that had always been the most 
significant zones of monopoly for U.S. telephone carriers. Importantly, the 
1996 Act does less to remove existing monopoly regulation than to create 
new rules that should ostensibly allow increasing deregulation of local 
telecommunications over time. The 1996 Act can usefully be thought of as 
scaffolding put in place to support the construction of a competitive 
telecommunications market. 
The Act's "scaffolding" consists of three essential components. Firstly, 
the 1996 Act mandates that telecommunications carriers interconnect for the 
purpose of originating and terminating each other's traffic 3. Without this 
provision subscribers of one carrier could not be assured of being able to 
send calls to or receive calls from subscribers of other carriers. Incumbent 
carriers would then have an enormous advantage in attracting or retaining 
customers over new entrants because of the larger universe of 
correspondents – virtually the entire subscriber base in 1996 – that the 
incumbent could promise. Secondly, the Act requires incumbent local 
exchange carriers to allow competitors to use parts of the incumbents' own 
networks to provide competing service 4. Thus, if new entrants would be 
competitively "impaired" without access to, say, the incumbents' central-
office switches, the Act grants them access to the incumbents' switches on 
an "unbundled" (i.e. standalone) basis and at cost-based rates. Thirdly, the 
Act requires incumbent local carriers to sell their services wholesale, at 
regulated rates, to new carriers that wish to enter the market as resellers of 
the incumbent's service 5. 
                     
2 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 (D.D.C. 1982) (aff'd 460 
U.S. 1001 (1983)). 
3 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2) 
4 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3). 
5 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(4). 
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Monopoly has been the premise for regulation  
The rationale for each kind of regulation just discussed depends largely 
on the monopoly structure of the local telephone market. First, consider rate 
regulation. The government does not regulate prices of the vast majority of 
goods and services sold in the United States. Actual or potential rivalry from 
other firms drives any given supplier away from the high monopoly price 
level that exists in the absence of competition and thus eliminates the need 
for government to step in to protect consumers from market power. 
Even where some market power exists, the government uses price 
regulation sparingly because of regulation's harmful incentive effects that 
can impede the development of competition. Government-imposed price 
limits may diminish incentives for the incumbents or potential challengers to 
innovate, reduce profit opportunities that attract new entrants, and ultimately 
entrench both a particular provider and a particular technology in the market, 
to the detriment of consumers. 
Universal service regulation was also tied to the monopoly structure of 
the local telephone market, although more in its form than in its purpose. 
Funding universal service through geographical rate averaging and implicit 
subsidy flows within a firm is hard to rationalize or sustain outside of the 
monopoly context. Competition is the enemy of such subsidies because new 
entrants naturally "cream skim," targeting low-cost, high-margin customers 
and avoiding the high-cost, low-margin (or negative-margin) customers, 
thereby eliminating the revenues on which the implicit subsidy flows depend. 
Direct subsidies (as opposed to implicit or "cross" subsidies), however, do 
not necessarily fail or lose their policy rationale when a market becomes 
competitive. Subsidies may be aimed directly at high costs where they exist 
and need not come indirectly from high profits earned elsewhere. 
Competition immediately reduces the latter and may only slowly reduce the 
former. Direct subsidies for particular consumers therefore exist in many 
markets, such as housing, food, and education where providers may not 
have much market power, but where prices may still be too high for some 
would-be buyers to have access 6. So, a distributional policy for 
telecommunications that accomplishes universal-service objectives is not 
tied to monopoly; but a mechanism for achieving those policies that applies 
                     
6 See, e.g. National Housing Act § 203(b) (providing mortgage subsidies), the Food Stamp Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., and 20 U.S.C. 1018 (governing delivery of financial assistance to 
students pursuing higher education). 
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only to a particular firm or set of firms, and that depends on implicit subsidy 
flows, is tied to monopoly market structure. 
Finally, some means of regulating monopoly scope are also closely tied 
to single-firm market structure and lose much of their basis as competition 
emerges. At the most obvious level, once a firm has rivals it no longer has 
any monopoly to extend. In a competitive market, a firm's efforts to bundle 
products and services in a way that harms consumers will be disciplined by 
the rival offerings of the firm's competitors. Consider a tariff that required any 
phone service customer to also rent its telephone from the carrier. If that 
packaging somehow allowed the carrier to provide either the phone or the 
service at particularly low cost to customers, then customers would gain 
from the package. However, if the bundle were just a way for the carrier to 
gain extra profits, under competitive conditions consumers would turn to 
other carriers that either offer a cheaper bundle or do not require consumers 
to buy a bundle at all. Similarly, restrictions on the lines of business a firm 
can enter make economic sense only if the firm has market power over 
some essential input – for example, "bottleneck" access to the local 
exchange – that allows extension of power in one market into another 
market. Such leveraging of the local network bottleneck into market power 
over long distance was part of the theory behind the break-up of AT&T and 
the imposition of line-of-business restrictions on the RBOCs 7. As alternative 
paths into the local exchange arise through competition, control over 
bottleneck facilities diminishes and along with it so does the premise for a 
priori restrictions on a firm's entry into adjacent markets. 
Monopoly and the rationale for the 1996 Act 
The network unbundling and wholesale pricing provisions of the 1996 Act 
are also premised on the existence of local exchange monopolies. The 
soundness of those rules depends on the assumption that, in the absence of 
access to the incumbent's facilities, new entrants will not be able to offer 
services to customers in the first place. This assumption is valid only if 
incumbents have both an economic scale that imposes a barrier to entry and 
a monopoly over the facilities new entrants could lease in an effort to 
overcome that entry barrier. Those conditions would not hold if the 
incumbent faced competition from other carriers providing services that 
                     
7 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 (D.D.C. 1982) (aff'd 460 
U.S. 1001, 1983). 
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consumers could effectively substitute for conventional local exchange 
service – in other words, they would not hold under competition. For 
example, competition would show both that entry barriers were not so high 
that they prevented competition against the incumbent and that there were 
other sources and kinds of facilities potential entrants could use to set up 
their service offerings. Thus, the 1996 Act's unbundling rules depend both 
for their purpose and their structure on the existence of monopoly in the local 
telecommunications market. Consistent with that logic, they apply only to 
incumbent local exchange carriers and not to all providers (as the 
interconnection rules do) 8. The same argument applies to the wholesale 
pricing provisions of the 1996 Act 9. 
The main body of U.S. telecommunications regulation, at both the state 
and federal level, therefore continues to be, at root, monopoly regulation. 
There is no question that such regulation generally applies less broadly and 
stringently than it has in the past – states have given incumbent carriers 
increasing pricing flexibility and the FCC's has reduced its unbundling 
requirements for ILECS, for example. But much regulation remains, the need 
and justification for which are increasingly difficult to see in today's more 
competitive marketplace. 
  The new market structure warrants  
a new regulatory approach 
Regulatory costs that might be beneficial to incur in the presence of 
monopoly become less so as a market moves toward competition. Given the 
data demonstrating how the U.S. telecommunications market has made that 
transition, there is good reason to think that the costs of the current 
approach for regulating the telecommunications industry will outweigh the 
benefits going forward. The section concludes with a discussion of a more 
suitable approach to regulating today's more competitive telecomm-
unications marketplace. 
                     
8 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3). 
9 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(4). 
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The costs of regulation  
Policy makers have long understood the difficulties of implementing price 
regulation 10. A threshold problem with determining "reasonable" rates for a 
service is that the information necessary for the relevant calculations is in 
the hands of the very company being regulated. "Moral hazard" problems 
thus abound because a firm can affect a regulatory agency's determination 
of allowable rates by manipulating underlying accounting data. However, 
even in cases where regulators can resolve such information asymmetries 
and obtain accurate cost data, rate regulation raises several perplexing 
problems. Firstly, regulators must divide the firm's costs into three 
categories: costs that may be passed on to consumers and on which the firm 
is allowed to earn a return, costs that may be passed through to consumers, 
but on which a return is not allowed, and costs that the firm may not pass 
through at all to consumers 11. 
Secondly, putting aside the difficulties of assessing a firm's expenditures 
for purposes of determining a "rate base" on which to calculate a firm's 
allowable return, regulators next face the difficult challenge of how to value 
that rate base. For many years the only approach the U.S. Supreme Court 
found constitutionally valid was to allow a return on the "fair value" of a 
utility's assets 12. The idea is to allow return on those investments that have 
resulted in productive facilities and to disallow return on investment that has 
failed to produce beneficial assets for the firm. Unfortunately, distinguishing 
and valuing the relevant assets is notoriously difficult – a "laborious and 
baffling task" in the words of the Supreme Court 13. The other principal 
method of valuing the rate base has been to look at the firm's original 
financial investment and to allow a return so long as those investments were 
prudent at the time they were made. While the courts have approved such 
an approach 14, it does not weed out bad investments with no current 
economic value and does not adjust the current rate of return for factors like 
inflation and changing replacement costs of capital that reflect the utility's 
current risks and financial opportunities. 
                     
10 3 FCC Rcd. 3195 (1988). 
11 4 FCC Rcd. at 2883-84. See also VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINTON, 1995, at 381. 
12 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. at 457. 
13 Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 292 
(1923). 
14 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575, 605 (1944); Duquesne 
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1988). 
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The 1996 Act gave rise to yet a different model of rate making for the 
purpose of determining the prices competitors pay for access to the 
incumbents' unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). In implementing the 
Act's prescription that rates for UNEs be based on cost, the FCC determined 
that costs should not be the embedded or historical costs of the network, but 
instead the total, forward-looking, incremental costs of providing each 
element (the "TELRIC" method; the acronym stands for total, long-run, 
incremental costs) 15. Properly implemented, this approach requires 
calculating the forward-looking economic value of a network and might 
appear to resemble the fair-value approach with all of its attendant 
difficulties. 
The FCC ultimately found TELRIC troublesome in three crucial respects. 
First, the Commission found that: "the TELRIC rules have proven to take a 
great deal of time and effort to implement, and the resulting drain on 
resources for interested parties and state Commissions can be tremendous" 
(FCC, 2003, pp. 18945,18948-49). The FCC further observed that:  
"These complicated and time-consuming proceedings may work to 
divert scarce resources from carriers that otherwise would use those 
resources to compete in local markets" (FCC, 2003, p. 18949).  
Secondly, the Commission found the costly proceedings to produce 
inconsistent results:  
"For any given carrier there may be significant differences in rates from 
state to state, and even from proceeding to proceeding within a state. 
We are concerned that such variable results may not reflect genuine 
cost differences but instead may be the product of the complexity of 
the issues, the general nature of our rules, and uncertainty about how 
to apply those rules" (FCC, 2003, p. 18949).  
Finally, the FCC found that: 
 "[…] the lack of predictability in UNE rates is difficult to reconcile with 
our desire that UNE rates send correct economic signals" (FCC, 2003, 
p. 18949). 
As the FCC's observation about incorrect economic signals indicates, the 
rate-setting function of monopoly regulation is costly not only in its 
administrative burdens, but in its effects on the economic incentives of 
market players. Consider first effects on the regulated firm. As already briefly 
                     
15 47 C.F.R. 51.505 
30   No. 60, 4th Q. 2005 
mentioned, firms subject to rate-of-return regulation (also called "cost-of-
service" regulation) have distorted incentives when it comes to deploying 
efficient, low-cost production technology. The lower the firm's allowable (for 
rate-base purposes) costs, the lower the firm's profits under a rate-of-return 
scheme. Not only does a firm subject to such regulation lack incentives to 
cut costs, it actually has an incentive to raise them, so as to increase the 
absolute level of profits provided by its regulated retail revenues. 
Firms under rate-of-return regulation also have an incentive to adopt 
capital and labour in a wasteful proportion – too much capital and too little 
labour – because the former is generally part of the rate base and so the firm 
recovers the expenditure and earns a return, whereas the firm only passes 
through the latter to consumers without receiving an additional return 
(AVERCH & JOHNSON, 1962). Incentive-based rate programs such as 
price-cap regulation greatly improve the incentive properties of traditional 
rate-of-return regulation by allowing firms to earn extra profits by cutting 
costs. However, as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, "The price-cap 
scheme starts with rates generated by the conventional cost-of-service 
formula" 16. So price-cap mechanisms provide less incentive to cut costs 
than competition, in which failure to be efficient means not just losing some 
profits, but losing customers altogether to rivals. 
Consider next the potential effects of regulated rates on potential 
entrants. The effects of incorrect regulated rates become particularly acute 
when a market is undergoing the transition to competition, especially in 
industries where firms must make large, fixed investments in infrastructure to 
provide a service. No firm goes into business to lose money. If regulators set 
prices so low that they do not provide an attractive rate of return on total 
costs, unregulated competitive entrants will not find the market attractive to 
enter; regulators risk deterring the competitive entry that could obviate the 
need for regulation in the first place. 
In a market moving toward competition, regulators consequently walk a 
fine line: regulated prices that are too high can act as focal points around 
which market prices may cluster. That is, even if the regulated firm has 
downward pricing flexibility, prices may be higher than in an unregulated 
setting if the incumbent must file tariffs that give advance notice of its 
intention to lower prices. There is empirical evidence that AT&T acted as a 
price leader in the long-distance telephony market when it was required to 
                     
16 Verizon v. FCC, 2004: 535 U.S. 467, 487. 
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file tariffs as a dominant firm. The principal competitors, MCI and Sprint, 
knew in advance what AT&T's prices would be and had an incentive to 
follow just under the "umbrella" of AT&T's prices, rather than aggressively 
cut prices themselves (MacAVOY, 1998). Regulated prices that are too high 
thus accomplish nothing, except possibly to raise consumer prices, in a 
market that would otherwise be naturally moving toward competition. 
Regulated prices that are too low also do harm. Entrants move into 
markets where they expect to earn a profit. Regulating the incumbent's rates 
to a level below that which provides the return competitors need to attract 
investment and profitably enter the market will deter competition and the 
many benefits it would provide to consumers. Regulators thus face a difficult 
task in markets in which competition is emerging: set rates at exactly the 
level that will allow an efficient firm to attract the investment necessary to 
compete in the marketplace. Rates above that level will make consumers 
worse off than the unregulated market, rates below that level will deter 
competition which would naturally lower prices and obviate the need for 
administratively costly regulation. Given the difficulties that regulators 
inevitably face in setting rates with such precision (recall the FCC's remarks 
about TELRIC, above) one must be sceptical about the wisdom of importing 
rate regulation schemes from a monopoly setting into an emerging 
competitive environment. 
The concerns raised above apply equally to regulation of wholesale or 
UNE rates under the 1996 Act. If UNE rates are too high they are pointless 
because they do not serve the policy goals and are therefore not worth the 
administrative burden. Yet the problem with UNE rates that are too low is 
more severe. As the FCC itself has acknowledged, rates that do not fully 
compensate incumbents for the incremental costs of providing UNEs 
undermine investment incentives and thwart the development of competing 
networks (FCC, 2003, p. 18947). Such low rates deter the incumbent from 
investing in its network and deter entrants from building their own networks 
by providing them with subsidized use of the incumbent's network. The 
result is less investment by incumbents and entrants alike, less innovation, 
and less price competition over time for consumers. 
Line-of-business restrictions are another form of regulation that imposes 
costs on society. Whether such limits are absolute, like the restrictions under 
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) or whether they more modestly govern 
the structure and terms of entry into adjacent markets as under the 1996 
Act, they have the effect of limiting competition and hence the economic 
performance of the market into which regulators control entry. One study, for 
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example, estimates that the MFJ's information-services restriction delayed 
the RBOCs from being able to introduce innovative services and thereby 
cost society over USD 1 billion in consumer welfare (HAUSMAN, 1997). 
Others have recognized more generally that even where some government 
regulation is necessary because unmonitored entry into markets could allow 
some firms to cause consumer harm, restrictions entail a tradeoff because 
they also reduce competition and potential innovation (ANTHONY et al., 
2002). 
The above discussion highlights only some examples of the costs of 
regulation. Its purpose is to show that regulation cannot casually be 
assumed to be costless or effective. The discussion also allows one to see 
that the benefits of regulation depend in important ways on the existence of 
an underlying monopoly. Rates that are set too low in a monopoly do not 
deter competitors – competitors do not exist either because they did not 
arise in a previously unregulated environment or because regulators 
determined the industry to be a natural monopoly in which multiple firms 
would be inefficient. Regulated rates that are too high in a monopoly setting 
may still be better than what the monopolist would charge if it were 
unconstrained. Monopoly thus allows regulation to be imprecise and still 
create consumer benefits. Under competition, even (or perhaps especially) 
emerging competition, regulators have no such margin for error. The errors 
and administrative costs that may still be compatible with net social gains 
under regulated monopoly become less so as competition develops. 
A new approach to telecommunications regulation 
In light of the discussion above some might say that the increasingly 
competitive and diverse market illustrated in the first section of this article 
eliminates the basis for any regulation at all. Others might argue, on the 
contrary, that the market has expanded but that the essential market power 
of incumbent local telephone monopolies remains unchecked. The facts do 
not entirely support either position. The market is certainly not perfectly 
competitive and substitution among alternative communications options, 
while considerable, is not complete. VoIP does not yet offer an emergency 
service comparable to landline 911 services; wireless quality is still more 
variable than conventional wireline quality; cable service can be disrupted by 
local power outages in a way that the circuit-switched local phone service 
cannot be; and access and affordability issues may remain of social policy 
concern. On the other hand, to believe that conventional local carriers 
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possess significant market power, one must provide a good reason to 
discount the evidence that local exchange carriers are losing traffic, 
customers, and revenues by both relative and absolute measures to 
competing technologies. 
The relevant policy questions are, firstly, whether continued, a priori 
regulation will improve the functioning of the market compared to what would 
result under market-based competition; and secondly, whether some 
alternative forms of regulation might be beneficial even if the conventional 
approach is not. This paper's discussion of this point suggests that the 
answer to the first question is no, but the answer to the second question is 
yes: some forms of intervention can benefit the telecommunications market 
by preserving and promoting competition. A recommendation against 
substantial a priori regulation does not mean that the U.S. 
telecommunications market should be without oversight or some basic 
"rules-of-the-road." The analysis of this paper does not, for example, 
necessarily imply that competitively neutral interconnection rules that 
obligate competing networks to exchange traffic should be eliminated; 
interconnection rules do not depend on monopoly for their rationale and 
there is a substantial debate over their continued necessity. 
Nor does this paper counsel against enjoining specific transactions or 
instances of conduct that proves to be harmful to competition and 
consumers. In fact, it is exactly such post-conduct enforcement responses 
that are appropriate in the current environment of the telecommunications 
market. It is hard to see in advance what strategies will lead to the most 
competitive environment or be most responsive to consumer desires. Rules 
designed to restrain or govern firm behaviour on a prospective basis may 
distort competition with little expected payoff. However, responding to 
behaviour that proves anticompetitive as it arises allows authorities to 
prevent bad activity without impeding or deterring beneficial competition. 
Indeed, without cautious, vigilant competition enforcement and merger 
review in telecommunications markets, the consumer gains that competition 
is bringing could be lost. 
The ex post enforcement regime this paper recommends is analogous to 
rule-of-reason scrutiny under U.S. antitrust laws. Before the courts hold a 
firm liable for most conduct that could be anticompetitive – exclusive dealing, 
for example – plaintiffs must prove actual anticompetitive effects that 
outweigh pro-competitive benefits of the conduct. There is a reluctance to 
bar most conduct in advance because many economic actions (excepting 
per se antitrust violations like price fixing) may have either beneficial or 
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harmful effects on consumers, depending on specific circumstances. In the 
emerging, competitive market for U.S. telecommunications, the same ex 
post, case-by-case perspective is warranted. A good example of such an 
approach is the FCC's 2005 enforcement action against Madison River 
Communications, which the FCC found to be interfering with transmissions 
between customers and VoIP provider Vonage. One solution to such 
potential discrimination problems is to impose rules and standards for how 
telecommunications carriers transport and transmit different kinds of content 
and services. It is preferable in a dynamic and uncertain market to let 
competition between networks govern such performance dimensions, but to 
punish and enjoin discrimination that is clearly anticompetitive. That is 
exactly what the FCC did to Madison River. 
The antitrust-like model is not perfect. Some cases will escape scrutiny 
altogether and some well-aimed enforcement efforts may fail. Moreover, 
some harm generally accrues before agencies can seek a fine or injunction. 
However, enforcement problems and compensation issues can be 
addressed through effective enabling legislation and proper institutional 
assignment – foe example, to the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division 
or the FCC – of enforcement jurisdiction. More to the point, ex post 
enforcement against specific, anticompetitive acts avoids the kind of costs 
(discussed above) that a priori rules can create through their imposition of 
one-size-fits-all requirements and restrictions. As the benefits of a priori 
regulation diminish with competition, the more targeted approach of ex post 
competition enforcement becomes more appropriate. The empirical 
evidence is compelling that the U.S. telecommunications market has 
reached that crossroad. 
  Conclusion 
As telecommunications markets in the United States transform, 
regulation has remained essentially static in its fundamental approach and 
monopoly assumptions. To be sure, regulation has certainly changed in its 
strength and scope, and in some important areas has little remaining bite. 
However, at the state level and in several important areas of federal 
regulation, rules remain whose motivating, monopoly conditions no longer 
hold. As these rules become increasingly obsolete, they risk causing 
increasing harm to the incentives of incumbents and new entrants alike to 
invest and compete for the benefit of consumers. 
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History supports the argument for shifting sooner rather than later from 
an a priori, rule-based telecommunications policy to regulation that mirrors 
the more case-specific, ex post approach of competition policy. There is an 
administrative and legislative precedent in the United States for deregulating 
markets whose structure is similar to that currently found in "local" 
telecommunications. In the cases of cable rate deregulation 17, long-
distance tariffs, and wireless telephony, the FCC or Congress decided to 
forebear from regulating in circumstances no more competitive than the local 
telecommunications market today. Moreover, there is evidence that past 
delays in deregulation in a variety of industries have been costly to American 
consumers. A recent study by FINE & FIGUEIREDO (2005) examines the 
deregulation of railroads, natural gas, banking, airlines and mobile 
telephony. The authors find evidence across industries to show that once 
competition develops in a regulated industry, an incremental approach to 
deregulation only harms consumers and distorts economic incentives. They 
conclude from their analysis that conditions are ripe in U.S. 
telecommunications for decisive change and that hesitant, piecemeal 
deregulation will prove costly. Based on the above analyses of recent market 
data, of the rationale for regulation, and of the costs and benefits of 
continuing with conventional monopoly regulation; this article agrees. 
                     
17 8 FCC Rcd. 5631, ¶8 (1993). 
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